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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE ACCIDENT RATE IN
COMMERCIAL AVIATION

C

OMMERCIAL AVIATION accidents are often highly publicized and carry significant political and economic implications. Ideally, the investigations that follow reveal deficiencies
and make recommendations to prevent any recurrences. Accidents are not inevitable, and it has been said that a company
often gets the accident it deserves, for with hindsight, the reasons are often fairly obvious. The laws of physics, and especially
of gravity, are uncompromising. "Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it
is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or
neglect."'
Since accidents usually flow from a web of interacting factors
and events, both latent and immediate, effective prevention
does not try to give weight to the factors involved but focuses
instead on rectifying all aspects of the systems in which they occur. A single error may merely be the last piece needed to complete the already-deficient web in the system, but it should not
be seen as the "cause," "primary cause," "single cause," or "probable cause."
Our concern in this paper is to explore some of the implications for criminal jurisprudence that flow from civil aviation's
interests in preventing accidents. Accident investigations are
not intended to attribute blame for the purposes of liability or
to identify someone to punish-a principle that is applicable to
all of the states who are signatories to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention).2 Indeed, there
could be one level of safety worldwide if all states adhered to the
standards of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) as a minimum.
Amongst the many reasons for the continued decline of accident rates are better technology, knowledge learned from errors, and the 'just culture." ' Though we are not able in this
context to analyze the figures for the safety of civil aviation in
any depth, they tell a clear and impressive tale: even if one considers only fatal accidents, then commercial civil aviation is,
I Roderick D. van Dam, PreservingSafety in Aviation: 'JustCulture" and the Administration ofJustice, 22 No. 2 AIR & SPACE L. 1, 6 (2009) (attributed to Capt. A.G.
Lamplugh of the British Aviation Insurance Group, London, in the 1930s).
2 Id. at 5.
3 van Dam, supra note 1, at 5, 7.

2009]

FLYING SAFELY

739

quite simply, safe and getting safer; the number of aircraft in
commercial service, the number of departures they have made,
and the number of hours they have flown have risen steadily
over the years, but accident rates have dropped at a greater and
indeed at a wholly disproportionate rate.4
Consider the following 5 graph prepared by Boeing Commercial Aircraft Corporation:
4 See National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accident Statistics,
1989-2008, http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/table2.htm (last visited Sept. 14,
2009).
5 The graph was provided courtesy of the Boeing Company. Boeing does not
endorse the Journal of Air Law and Commerce, this article, the author, or the author's opinion. Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Aviation Safety Division, Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents: Worldwide Operations
1959-2007 (2008), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2290522/Statistical-Summary-of-Commercial-Jet-Airplane-Accidents. Airplanes manufactured in
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) are excluded because of the lack of operational data,
as well as commercial airplanes operated in military service. Id. at 2. The figures
are not restricted to Boeing aircraft but cover worldwide commercial jet airplanes
that are heavier than 60,000 pounds maximum gross weight (MGW). Id. For
context, consider the following approximate data (variants of types may differ)
for familiar aircraft all of which are encountered in South Africa: in the data
range are the Boeing 737-800 (a variant of the smallest commercial jet built by
Boeing), which has a MGW of 174,200 pounds and can carry 189 passengers; and
the Airbus A320 which has a MGW of 162,900 pounds and typically carries 150
passengers; obviously within the data range are all variants of the Boeing 747 and
777 and the Airbus A380, all of which are very large and heavy aircraft indeed.
Boeing Commercial Airplanes 737 Family, http://boeing.com/commercial/737
family/pf/pf_800tech.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (specifying the Boeing
737-800 characteristics); Airbus Aircraft Families A320 Specifications, http://
www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies/a320/a320/specifications.html (last visited
Sept. 14, 2009) (specifying the Airbus A320 characteristics). Just within the datarange is the largest variant of the Bombardier Dash 8 (64,500 pounds and seventy
passengers). Bombardier, Q400.com - Specification, http://www.q400.com/
q400/en/specifications.jsp. On the other hand, outside the range of the Boeing
accident data but also widely used in southern Africa is the Embraer 145 with a
MGW of 46,275 pounds (fifty passengers). Embraer Commercial Jets, ERJ 145
Family, http://www.embraercommercialjets.com.br/english/content/erj/erj_
145.asp?tela=weights.dimensions (follow "ERJ 145 Spec Sheet" hyperlink) (last
visited Sept. 14, 2009). Popular variants of the Cessna Citation and Bombardier
Learjet (the archetypical "business jets") have MGWs of around 10-11,000 pounds
and can carry between five to ten passengers, and thus also fall well outside the
Boeing statistics. Wash. St. Dep't of Transp., Aviation Div., Airport Facility Requirements 32 (2008), available at http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/D3
2DAF64-6726-415A-8025-A4F4B4AAB57A/O/Chapter3AirportFacilityRequirements.pdf (specifying Learjet and Cessna passenger limits and MGW for Cessna);
The Learjet 31156136, http://www.airliners.net/aircraft-data/stats.main?id=265
(last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
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In 1998, there were approximately 6,000 commercial jet aircraft in the world-wide fleet, and they made approximately 12
million departures and logged 20 million flight hours; by 2007
the figures had risen to 20,702 aircraft that had made 20.8 million departures and logged 43 million hours. a According to one
interpretation of the statistics from 1926 to the present, the
worst year in aviation history was 1929 when fifty-one fatal accidents amounted to one accident for every one million miles
flown. Based on the current number of aircraft flying, this
would equate to 7000 fatal accidents per year.7
This totally unacceptable figure has been prevented by sustained, systemic, and professional management of risk by all parties in commercial aviation in programs in which technology
and the development of the 'just culture" have played a part.'
Accordingly, the gap above the lines in the graph represents
lives saved and a triumph for the belief that life is valuable and
worth protecting where possible-and not just for economic or
political reasons or out of guilt or fear.
In fact, the figures compiled for 2007 by Boeing show twentyone hull losses, fourteen of which Boeing described as "major"
accidents. 9 Nonetheless, however few they may be, each of the
Boeing Aviation Safety Div., supra note 5, at 13.
U.S. AIR CARRIERS (2009), available at
http://www.airlines.org/economics/specialtopics/SafetyRecordofCarriers.htm.
8 van Dam, supra note 1, at 1, 5.
9 Boeing Commercial Airplanes, supra note 5, at 12. Boeing defines these as
accidents in which any of three conditions is met: (i) the airplane was destroyed;
6

7 AIR TRANSP. ASS'N, SAFETY RECORD OF
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"major" accidents represents heartbreak and appalling social
loss, quite apart from the great economic cost.
II.

WHAT IS THE 'JUST CULTURE?"

The nature of the legal regime that applies to professional
pilots is elegantly depicted in R. v. Tayfel ° in the Manitoba
Court of Queen's Bench. The trial judge (Justice Beard) said:
The risks of death or serious injury arising from the activity
under consideration, being that of flying an aircraft, are very
high when compared to other similar activities such as driving a
vehicle. If, for any reason, the aircraft cannot remain aloft, it
falls to the ground and, almost without fail, all on board are
killed or seriously injured. It is almost unheard of for there to be
any survivors of a plane crash. For this reason, the aircraft industry is very highly regulated, much more so than other transportation-related industries. Transportation by air is more restricted
than other methods of transportation, and it is much more difficult to become a licensed pilot than it is to operate a car or other
motor vehicle. One example relates to the training required,
and one need only read the Keystone" operations manual to see
the extensive training and re-training, including annual ground
and height training that are required to ensure a pilot's continued proficiency.1 2
Justice Beard's view of the prospect of surviving aircraft
crashes is a somewhat pessimistic generalization, for crashes do
vary greatly in their consequences;1 3 however, we do agree with
the spirit behind her comments: it is precisely because aircraft
(ii) there were multiple fatalities; or (iii) there was one fatality and the airplane
was substantially damaged. Id. at 4.
10 R. v. Tayfel, [2007] 221 Man. R.2d 135, 2007 MBQB 265 (Can.).
11 Keystone is the defendant's employer and the operator of the aircraft involved. The facts are considered below. See infra Part VI.A.
12 Tayfel,
121. We are grateful to Capt. David Wall for drawing attention to
this decision.
13 On January 17, 2008, a Boeing 777-200 (a variant of the world's biggest twoengine airliner at the time) crashed and was destroyed when it experienced a
total loss of power as it was approaching London Heathrow to land. NTSB, FACTUAL REPORT AVIATION DCA08RA028 1 (2008), available at http://Nv.ntsb.gov/
ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA08RA028&rpt=fa. The entire complement of 136 passengers and the crew of sixteen survived with only minor injuries. Id.; Dr. Todd
Curtis, Initial Report Provided by the Air Accidents Investigation Branch on 18
January 2008, http://www.airsafe.com/analyze/aaib_initial.pdf
(noting that
there were sixteen crew members). At the other end of the scale, on June 1 an
Airbus A330-200 with 228 on board was lost in the mid-Atlantic. NTSB, FACTUAL
REPORT AVIATION DCA09RAUS2 1,4 (2009), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/
ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA09RA052&rpt=fa. There were no survivors. Id. at 4.
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crashes are so desperately dangerous that to prevent them, flying must be strictly regulated by good legislation that is wellimplemented and enforced.
One of the most effective ways of reducing and preventing
aviation accidents is to establish "non-punitive reporting
systems."14
The identification of errors, hazards, potential incidents and serious incidents is a fundamental element of any safety management system. Yet international surveys have revealed that many
air incidents go unreported because those involved [fear being
misunderstood and the prospect of what are felt to be unwarranted punishmeni and reprisals by] management or the regulatory authority. [However, since one cannot fix that of which one
is unaware, voluntary reporting] systems, as well as other safety
initiatives such as Flight Data Analysis (FDA) and Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), can only be effective in an environment that adopts a non-punitive culture. The unrestricted flow
and exchange of information is vital to improving safety, but unnecessary criminalization and punishment obstructs this flow. In
order for reporting systems
to be effective, a non-punitive envi15
ronment must prevail.
Such systems are supported and encouraged by the ICAO and
all major international aviation safety organizations, and the statistics show that they are far more efficient than the reactive
practice of ex post facto accident investigation. 16
The commercial aviation industry increasingly accepts that pilots-being human-will make errors, and the challenge is then
to establish error management and to build error-tolerant systems. 17 Most accidents involve human errors (some by "front
line" operators such as pilots and some latent and buried in the
systems, often by management); therefore, we need to know
about them to be able to fix them proactively."8 The alternative
is to find someone to blame ex post facto for being a human in a
high-risk system. It is this philosophy that lies at the heart of
what has come to be called in the commercial aviation industry
14 INT'L FED'N OF AIR LINE PILOTS' ASS'NS, IMPROVED ACCIDENT PREVENTION
NON-PUNITrvE REPORTING 09POS02 1 (2009), available at http://
www.ifalpa.org/ifalpa-statements/accident-analysis-a-prevention.html
(follow
"09POS02 Non-Punitive Reporting Download" hyperlink) [hereinafter IFALPA].
THROUGH

15 Id.

16
17
18

Id. at 1-2.
See id. at 2.
Id.
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the 'just culture" and that accident prevention initiatives promoted by the Chicago Convention encourage.' 9
This culture is non-punitive and based on three related elements: First, that air crew and others cooperate with aviation
authorities by providing an informed flow of information that
casts light on safety-related issues, enabling dangers to be dealt
with preemptively-before they reveal themselves in tragedy;
and second, to secure this cooperation by protecting such information and those who compile and reveal it for safety purposes,
by ensuring that it is protected from what the Chicago Convention-and specifically paragraph 5.12 and Attachment E of Annex 13-describes as "inappropriate use. "20
The third element is that the 'just culture" does not offer immunity to pilots: punishment is warranted in certain cases. 21 "A
'blame free' culture that was seen to be unable to touch a serious offender would have a negative effect on the morale of
other staff, just as one that unfairly prosecuted an individual
that had made an error trying to do the right thing for the company. ' 22 When one has regard for the various justifications for
the use of the criminal sanction, it is of interest to consider the
effects of this deliberate limitation of its use for what might be
described as retributive purposes such as revenge, expiation or
atonement, and denunciation, unless safety is thereby served.
The Chicago Convention, which established the ICAO, has approached this by raising the bar for the mens rea required for an
offense that imperils safety. 23 This is a theme that we hope will
become clear in the course of this article.
The 'just culture" is thus one with norms and values in which
front-line personnel are not punished for conduct or consequences that are unintended or unforeseeable because information leads to the management of the risk and continued safety
improvement. 24 It is not, however, a sentimental jurisprudence,
for it does not propose a blame-free culture, nor does it provide
19ICAO, Directors General of Civil Aviation Conference on a Global Strategy
for Aviation Safety, Montreal, Can., Mar. 20-22, 2006, Working Paper: Proposalsfor
FurtherImprovement of Aviation Safety Worldwide, 2.7, No. DGCA/06-WP/1 1 (Apr.
2, 2006), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/dgca/wp/dgca_06WP 11_e.
pdf.
20 See infra Part III.
21 IFALPA, supra note 14, at 1.
22 Id. at 2.
23 van Dam, supra note 1, at 6.
24 Id. at 4, 6.
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a "get out of jail free" card.2 5 There are behavioral limitations
outside of which prosecution will be required, for if one can
clearly identify the risk, one must know its potential for harm.2 6
If, despite this knowledge, one continues with the action, it
could be viewed as blameworthy behavior. 2 7 Accordingly, Attachment E sets out the three exceptions that it recommends
national laws should permit to protect safety information:
a) there is evidence that the occurrence was caused by an act
considered, in accordance with the law, to be conduct with intent
to cause damage, or conduct with knowledge that damage would
probably result, equivalent to reckless conduct, gross negligence
or wilful misconduct;
b) an appropriate authority considers that circumstances reasonably indicate that the occurrence may have been caused by conduct with intent to cause damage, or conduct with knowledge
that damage would probably result, equivalent to reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct; or
c) a review by an appropriate authority determines that the release of the safety information is necessary for the proper administration of justice, and that its release outweighs the adverse
domestic and international impact such release may have on the
future availability of safety information.2 8
The investment of time and effort in establishing a 'Just culture" is worthwhile for the widespread influence it would have
on all aspects of accident prevention.
III.

ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND SAFETY DATA

The ICAO is an agency of the United Nations established "in
order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe
and orderly manner and that international air transport services
may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and
operated soundly and economically. '"29
25

IFALPA, supra note 14, at 2.

26

See id.

Id.
Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annex 13, Attachment E, Legal
Guidance for the Protection of Information from Safety Data Collection and
Processing Systems, 1 4.1, available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/dgca/Annexl3attEen.pdf [hereinafter Attachment El.
29 Convention on International Civil Aviation, pmbl., Dec. 7, 1944, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (9th ed., ICAO Doc. 7300/9, 2006), available at http://
www.icao.int/icaonet/dcs/7300-cons.pdf. The ICAO came into being on April
4, 1947, following the ratification of the twenty-sixth state (there are now 190
contracting states). Id. at pmbl. n.1. It is a specialized agency of the United Na27
28
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This article is concerned with Annex 13 to the Convention
entitled "Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation," and Attachment E thereto, entitled "Legal Guidance for the Protection
of Information from Safety Data Collection and Processing Systems. ' 0 Paragraph 3.1 of Annex 13 to the Convention
prescribes that "[t]he sole objective of the investigation of an
accident or incident shall be the prevention of accidents and
incidents. It is not the purpose of this activity to apportion
31
blame or liability."
As the Foreword to Annex 13 explains, Annexes to the Convention establish numerous standards 2 and recommended
practices.3 3 The category into which a provision falls is readily
determined by the language in which it is drafted: for example,
the quotation above sets out a standard, for it uses the word
"shall" and the phrase "it is not" in order to make clear that the
matters dealt with are mandatory and bind parties to the Convention as a matter of international law.34 On the other hand,
the word "should" denotes a recommended practice. 35 Attachment E describes itself as providing "legal guidance for the protection of information from safety data collection and
processing systems" and explains that:
tions linked to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). NTSB, NTSB-Related Sites, http://www.ntsb.gov/related.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
30 Attachment E, supra note 28, at 1.
31 The Convention on International Civil Aviation: Annex 13, Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation,
3.1 (9th ed. 2001), available at http://
www.airsafety.com.au/trinvbil/C619icao.pdf, amended by Adoption of Amendment 11 to Annex 13 (Council - 177th Session, Working Paper No. C-WP/12619,
2006), available at http://www.icao.int/Hyperdocs/display.cfm?v=2&name=CWP
%2F12619&Lang=E [hereinafter Annex 13].
32 Id. These are defined in the Foreword to Annex 13 as
Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, mat6riel, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or regularity
of international air navigation and to which Contracting States will
conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event of impossibility of compliance, notification to the Council [of the ICAO] is
compulsory under Article 38 [of the Convention].
33 Id. These are defined in the Foreword to Annex 13 as
Any specification for physical characteristics, configuration, matriel, performance, personnel or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized as desirable in the interests of safety,
regularity or efficiency of international air navigation, and to which
Contracting States will endeavour to conform in accordance with
the Convention.
34 See Annex 13, supra note 31,
3.1.
35 Id. 8.
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The guidance contained in this Attachment... takes the form of
a series of principles that have been distilled from examples of
national laws and regulations provided by States. The concepts
described in these principles could be adapted or modified to
meet the particular needs of the State enacting laws and regulations to protect safety information.3 6
As we show below, Attachment E has had implications on the
nature of criminal liability and mens rea. Its text commences,
"[t] he protection of safety information from inappropriate use
is essential to ensure its continued availability, since the use of
safety information for other than safety-related purposes may inhibit the future availability of such information, with an adverse
effect on safety." 7 Aviation indeed makes interesting use of the
criminal law in order to achieve safety.
Attachment E defines "safety information" as information that
is contained in safety data collection and processing systems
(SDCPS) established for the sole purpose of improving aviation
safety and that qualifies for protection under the Attachment.
"Safety information should qualify for protection from inappropriate use according to specified conditions that should include,
but not necessarily be limited to: the collection of information
of the inforwas for explicit safety purposes and the disclosure
38
mation would inhibit its continued availability.
The systems referred to are-in summary-the records pertaining to investigations as described in Chapter 5 of Annex
13, 39 mandatory and voluntary incident reporting systems, and
automatic and manual "self-disclosure" reporting systems.4 ° The
last-mentioned includes flight data recorders (FDRs-the socalled "black boxes"), cockpit voice recorders (CVRs) that aircraft above a certain size are obliged to carry, and Quick Access
Recorders (QARs), which are used in FDA programs. 4 No data
1.4.
Attachment E, supra note 28,
1.1.
38 Id.
1.5, 3.1.
39 Annex 13, supra note 31,
5.12. In summary, Annex 13, 1 5.12 refers to all
statements taken by the investigation authorities; all communications between
persons who were involved in the operation of the aircraft (which would thus
include air traffic control); medical or private information about those involved
in the accident or incident; CVR data and transcripts; and opinions made in the
analysis of information, including FDR data.
1.5.
40 Attachment E, supra note 28,
41 ICAO, ICAO Accident Prevention ProgrammeDoc. 9422 7-3, 7-4 (2005), available
at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/anb/aig/app-20050907.pdf. By agreement with
air crews, FDA programs can be used to monitor normal operations routinely to
36

37 Id.
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from any of these may be used for purposes other than accident
or incident investigation "unless the appropriate authority for
the administration of justice in that State determines that their
disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on that or any future
investigations. "42
Safety information should thus be distinguished from the evidence used in criminal proceedings. It is important to appreciate that the difference relates to the purpose and manner in
which it is compiled and collected, and it is this that affects how
and where Annex 13 and Attachment E propose it should be
used. To take a simple example, an investigation into an accident or incident may need to consider what the crew members
said to each other, which may be determined quite simply from
the information recovered from a CVR. However, before CVR
data can be used in a criminal trial, a positive decision has to be
taken first by "the appropriate authority for the administration
of justice in that State" that the circumstances are as stated in
paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13." Attachment E would have States
pass legislation requiring this admissibility in criminal proceedings to be tested by the standard that it proposes should be established, substantially echoing Annex 13."
Investigations into accidents and incidents must be kept separate and independent from what one might call "legal" investigations that determine criminal or civil liability.4 5 Their aims
are totally different. The distinction between an inquiry that is
directed at determining the reasons for an accident or incident
without any consideration of imposing blame on anyone, and a
trial that is directed at precisely that issue, raises squarely the
purposes of the criminal sanction in the context of safety, and
the clearest illustration of the problem emerges from the use of
safety data. This is frequently of the greatest value in determining the causes of an accident or incident, but unless the purpose
of the criminal sanction is simply vengeance, then the rule that
evidence of what is said and recorded in the heat of the moment
reveal not only air crew errors but also other problems and risks relating, for
example, to training, Air Traffic Control, equipment, fatigue, distractions, rush,
corporate pressures and bad procedures. They enable such matters to be dealt
with confidentially to prevent recurrence. Id. at 6-3, 6-5.
5.12.
42 Annex 13, supra note 31,
43 Id.
5.12.
- See Attachment E, supra note 28.
4-5 SeeAnnex 13, supra note 31,
5.12.1.

748

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

might be admissible as part of the res gestae 6 should have no
application.4 7 This is indeed the purpose of paragraph 5.12 of
Annex 13. Safety data should be treated as confidential for use
only in accident and incident investigations; such data should be
disclosed only in the context of improving flight safety such as
through a statutory inquiry, and only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose of the inquiry." The same provisions
should also extend to statements made to an accident investigator to whom a pilot might be concerned to provide frank and
self-critical details about an occurrence. In any event, in a court,
a statement made under such circumstances may be inadmissible hearsay. 50 The central point remains: in whatever form it is,
Annex 13 starts from the position that the use of safety information should be limited to the purpose for which it is collected.51
In some countries the two processes-one investigation to determine the causes of an occurrence, and another to determine
criminal and civil liabilities that might arise-are conducted
concurrently, effectively nullifying the application of Paragraph

46 Hearsay statements may sometimes be considered to be sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted in evidence in some courts when they were made spontaneously and concurrently and as part of the res gestae ("things done") of a crime or
accident, even though they are "hearsay," on the basis that spontaneous statements in those circumstances are reliable. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN, PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO EVIDENCE 161 (2d ed. 2001).
47 See Attachment E, supra note 28, 1 4.1.
48 See Annex 13, supra note 31,
3.1.
49 Attachment E, supranote 28, 3.1. On February 25, 2009, a Turkish Boeing
737-800 crashed while on its final approach to Schipol (Amsterdam). Press Release, Dutch Safety Board 1 (2009), available at http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/
docs/rapporten/Persverklaring_4_maartGB.pdf. The flight crew was among
the nine who perished. Id. Within days and long before the official inquiry commenced, some flight safety data had been leaked on the internet and fed almost
instant public-and distasteful-speculation about the air crew's performance.
See id. at 1, 3. The utmost technical skill and experience are needed to interpret
flight and performance data to prevent misleading and erroneous conclusions.
Prejudice to legal proceedings and harm to individuals can easily ensue in attempts to satisfy public demands for swift explanations, someone to blame, and
trial by media through the publication of protected data-as has happened here
and in the TS-LBB accident. See infra Part VI.B. Moreover, the uncontrolled publication of CVR transcripts in particular may well amount to an invasion of privacy for which there can be no conceivable justification beyond sensationalist
voyeurism.
50 Jack London, Issues of Trustworthiness and Reliability of Evidence from NTSB Investigations in Third Party Liability Proceedings, 68 J. AIR L. & CoM. 39, 40 (2003).
51 Annex 13, supra note 31,
5.12.
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3.1 of Annex 13.52 This may lead to the imposition of criminal
liability under circumstances that tend to undermine the sense
of justice and confidence in the system." For unless the accident or incident investigation is conducted separately and independently, the legal investigation tends to take priority.
IV.

THE USE OF SAFETY INFORMATION: SOME
LEGISLATIVE EXAMPLES
A.

SOUTH AFRICA

As its Memorandum states, the Civil Aviation Bill of 2008 repeals and replaces the Aviation Act of 1962, 5 4 the Civil Aviation
Offences Act of 1972, 5 5 and the South African Civil Aviation Authority Act of 1998.56 It contains provisions to secure "compliance with South Africa's international obligations relating to
applicable international
conventions and international
57
agreements.
Part 6 of the new Act 58 deals with the handling of on-board
recordings (OBRs) .5 These are defined (in summary) to be recordings and transcripts of flight deck voice communications
and video recordings of the activities of the personnel of an aircraft using recording equipment that is intended not to be controlled by the personnel.6 ° It should be noted that the
definition does not include flight data recorders or manuallymaintained logs. 6 1 The Act prescribes that OBRs are "privileged. '6 2 Access is controlled by the Aviation Safety Investigation Board, which is empowered to use on-board recordings in
52 Ramon Lopez, Accident Probes Hamstrung by Criminal Sanctions; Safety News,
Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/Accident-Probes-Hamstrung-By-Criminal-Sanctions-Safety-News_30308.html.
53 Civil Aviation Bill 73 of 2008, Memorandum (S. Afr.).
54 Aviation Act 74 of 1962 (S. Mr.).
55 Civil Aviation Offenses Act 10 of 1972 (S. Afr.).
56 Civil Aviation Authority Act 40 of 1998 (S. Afr.).
57 Civil Aviation Bill 73 of 2008, Memorandum (S. Afr.).
58 Id. §§ 46-52. At the time of writing, the bill is awaiting signature by the state
president and it will be referred to in this context.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61
62

§ 46.
See id. § 46.
Id. § 47. Section 47 states that
...
[E]xcept as provided by this section, no person, including any
person to whom access is provided under this section, must(a) knowingly communicate an on-board recording or permit it
to be communicated to any other person; or

750

JOURNAL OF MR LAW AND COMMERCE

the interest of aviation safety. 63 In particular, § 50 provides for
access to OBRs by peace officers, judicial inquests, and other
investigators.64 Access must be given to a coroner who is conducting an investigation and who needs it for that purpose, or to
any person carrying out a coordinated investigation under
§ 13.65 Where, in any proceedings before a criminal court, a request for the production and discovery of an on-board recording is made, the court must notify the Aviation Safety
Investigation Board of the request if the Board is not already a
party to the proceedings; it must examine the OBR in camera;
and it must give the Aviation Safety Investigation Board a reasonable opportunity to make representations.6 6 If the court
concludes that "in the circumstances of the case that the public
interest in the proper administration of justice outweighs the
privilege attached to the [OBR]," it must "order the production
and discovery of the [OBR], subject to such restrictions or conditions [it] considers appropriate."67 It may require any person
to give evidence that relates to the OBR. Presumably, this is intended to deal with the rules of evidence relating to its
provenance.6"
Section 52 of the Act provides that:
An on-board recording may not be used against any of the following persons in disciplinary proceedings, proceedings relating
to the capacity or competence of an officer or employee to perform the officer's or employee's functions, or in legal or other
proceedings:
(a) Air crew members;
(b) airport vehicle operators;
(c) flight service station specialists;
(b) be required to produce an on-board recording or give evidence relating to it in any legal, disciplinary or other
proceedings.
63 Id. §§ 48-51.
64 Id. § 50.
65 Id. §§ 13, 50. This article is restricted to the effects in criminal cases, and
does not deal further with inquests, proceedings before coroners, civil cases, and
other proceedings.
66 Id. § 51.
67 Id.
68 Electronic Communication and Transaction Act 25 of 2002, §§ 14-15 (S.
Mr.). It appears that such recordings must now be dealt with as "documents" as
defined in the Act, and their provenance proved accordingly for them to be admissible. See generally P.J. Schwikkard & S.E. van der Merwe, PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE, (3d ed. 2009).

2009]

FLYING SAFELY

messages respecting air traffic control,
(d) persons who relay
69
or related matters.
Put simply, this appears to mean that OBRs may not be used as
prosecution evidence in a trial of air crew or others listed in the
section.
If "a court of law" does not include a criminal court, then this
appears to go far beyond the prescribed standard7 ° of the Chicago Convention. While Annex 13 states that "It]he sole objective of the investigation of an accident or incident shall be the
prevention of accidents and incidents,"71 it also envisages the
possibility that criminal trials may also occur, stating in paragraph 5.12:
The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall not make the following records available for purposes
other than accident or incident investigation, unless the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that State determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic
and international impact such action may have on that or any
future investigations:
d) cockpit voice recordings and transcripts from such recordings; and
e) recordings72and transcriptions of recordings from air traffic
control units;
Attachment E states the recommended practices 73 to give effect to the exceptions to the privilege attached to such data by
Annex 13.
The South African Civil Aviation Regulations 1997 now read:
12.04.6 (1) The following records shall not be made available for
purposes other than accident or incident investigations, unless a
court of law determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and international impact such action may have on
that or future investigations, taking into account all applicable
law(a) all statements taken from persons by the investigator/s of
the investigation team in the course of the investigation;
69 Bill 73 of 2008, § 52.

See Attachment E, supra note 28, at vii.
See Annex 13, supra note 31, at 3.1.
5.12.
72 Id.
73 Attachment E, supra note 28.
74 Annex 13, supra note 31,
5.12.
70
71
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(b) all records of communications between persons having
been involved in the operation of the aircraft;
(c) medical and private information regarding persons involved in the accident or incident;
(d) cockpit voice recordings and transcripts from such
recordings;
(e) recordings and transcriptions of recordings from air traffic control units; and
(f)opinions expressed in the analysis of information, including information obtained from flight recorders.
(2) These records shall be included in the final report or its appendices only when pertinent to the analysis of the accident or
incident.
(3) Parts of the record not relevant to the analysis shall not be
disclosed. 75
This substantially enacts the wording of paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13.
It is also important to note that the International Federation
of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA), in a position statement,
while "not supporting" the caveat to paragraph 5.12 of Annex
13, states that it expects the caveat to be applied strictly by a
court or applicable authority. 76 But IFALPA makes it clear that
it has its feet on the ground:
The intent of both paragraph 5.12 and the explanatory material
in Attachment E isto ensure that the accident investigation has
as much information available to it as possible to assess the factors behind an accident. For information such as witness statements to be given freely, the witnesses have to have confidence
that these statements will not be used against them. It is obvious
that there are situations where a pilot who for political or personal reasons deliberately crashes an aircraft, or has an accident
while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, where prosecution
is warranted. Typically the prosecution will proceed after the investigation has established that it was not in fact an accident but
an intentional act. More controversially, there could be circumstances where a pilot was so reckless in his handling of a flight
that an accident resulted. The test here would be "should the
pilot have known that by continuing the conduct harm would
75

Government Notice (GN) R1219/1981, 12.04.6 (S. Mr.).

76 International Federation of Airline Pilots' Ass'ns, Use of Accident Related Safety

Information, Position Statement 09POS03, http://www.ifalpa.org/downloads/
Level 1 /IFALPA%20Statements/Acciden t%20Prevention/09P0S03%20Use%20
of%20accident%20related%20safety%20information.pdf [hereinafter IFALPA,
Position Statement].
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most probably have resulted?" An example here would be taking-off and flying to a destination even though calculations reveal
that there is most likely not enough fuel on board and subsequently running out of fuel and crashing after over flying alternates where more fuel was available.
None of these examples is exhaustive but the common element is
that a pilot intended that an accident should happen, or should
have known that by not doing something, or by doing something
that an accident was likely to happen, even if he/she did not intend it. As a profession we are committed to promoting and
maintaining the highest standards, and just as every other profession and employment is subject to legal sanction we should not
seek to put pilots above the law under the circumstances just described. Otherwise, there is a real danger that the public and
authorities will view the protections encompassed in Annex 13
and Attachment E, not as necessary safeguards to ensure that the
lessons from an accident are learned and flight safety is improved,
but as self-serving protections to put pilots above the
77
law.

It appears that the effect of the Act is that the defense may
seek, in any trial, to rely on an OBR; but an OBR will be admissible against an accused only if that person is not listed in § 52.78
In all cases, the procedures specified in § 52 must be followed.7 9
However, this does not appear to be what either the Chicago
Convention provides for or what IFALPA considers might be
necessary. The procedure set out in § 51 of the Act would seem
to satisfy the Convention and to comply with the spirit of Attachment E if it were extended to cover the cases considered above
where a prosecution might be appropriate, and it is inconceivable how safety can be promoted by disregarding the simple
common sense in the final sentence of the IFALPA Position
Statement.8 0 Attachment E makes it clear that "[i]t is not the
purpose of protecting safety information to interfere with the
proper administration ofjustice in States," and that national legislation should ensure that "a balance is struck between the
need for the protection of safety information in order to improve aviation safety, and the need for the proper administration of justice. '"81
77 Id.
78

Civil Aviation Bill, 73 of 2008, § 50 (S. Mr.).

79 Id. § 52.
80 IFALPA, Position Statement, supra note 76.

81 Attachment E, supra note 28,

11 2.2-2.3.
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There is certainly a balance to be sought. On the one hand,
an OBR involves highly intrusive surveillance of an air crew's
2
workplace and is involuntary and uncontrolled by the air crew.8
It becomes tolerable only if its use is strictly limited to what is
needed for safety purposes; accordingly, its routine use in legal
8 3
proceedings is considered to be unfair and is strongly resisted.
On the other hand, in the rare and highly extraordinary case
where there is evidence of the type of conduct of the nature
described in paragraph 4.1 of Attachment E, it is hard to see
what legitimate interest is protected by excluding what may be
crucial evidence. 4
B.

AUSTRALIA

Annex 13 and Attachment E have been given statutory recognition in Australia by the Transport Safety Investigation Act,
2003.85 The objects of the Act are stated in § 7 and (in summary) are to improve transport safety by providing for the reporting of transport safety matters; to publish the results from
the independent investigation of transport accidents and other
incidents that might affect transport safety; and to make "safety
action statements" and recommendations based on these, that
draw on the results of those investigations.86 The Act provides:
The following are not objects of this Act:
(a) apportioning blame for transport accidents or incidents;
(b) providing the means to determine the liability of any person
in respect of a transport accident or incident;
82

Civil Aviation Bill, § 46(b).

83 See Attachment E, supra note 28,
1.1.
84 On October 31, 1999, a Boeing 767-366ER on a scheduled EgyptAir service

from Los Angeles to New York and Cairo crashed in international waters off Nantucket Island, Massachusetts, killing all 217 people on board. NTSB Publications,
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/aab0201.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
The report of the United States National Transportation Safety Board concluded
that the aircraft had been flown deliberately into the water by the first officer. Id.
The Egyptian Government disputes this, and the Egyptian CAA report claims that
its suggested alternative interpretations are consistent with the transcribed flight
deck conversations which were recovered from the CVR. Egyptian Civil Aviation
Authority, http://www.ntsb.gov/events/ea990/docket/ecaa-report.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). The transcripts are part of both reports; had there been a
criminal trial of the first officer, it is difficult to see what purpose would have
been served by excluding them. See id.
85 Transport Safety Investigation Act, 2003, §§ 48-59 (Austl.) (Long Title: "An
Act to provide for investigation of transport accidents and other matters affecting
transport safety, and for related purposes").
86 Id. § 7(1) (repealed 2009).
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(c) assisting in court proceedings between parties (except as expressly provided by this Act);
(d) allowing any adverse inference to be drawn from the
fact that
87
a person is subject to an investigation under this Act.
The Act creates two classes of information and imposes farreaching restrictions on their use. 88 In the briefest summary, an
OBR is defined as consisting of, or mainly of, "sounds or images,
or sounds and images, of persons in the control area of a transport vehicle."8 " "Restricted information" covers a wide range of
oral or written or recorded information collected in the course
of an investigation or relating to a vehicle that is or was the subject of an investigation. 0
C.

UNITED KINGDOM

What appears to be an unusual non-legislated approach to the
use of safety information in criminal courts has been adopted in
the United Kingdom (UK)."
A Memorandum of Understanding between the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch
(AAIB),92 drawn up in October 2008, sets out how information
is to be shared between the two. 9 3 The AAIB receives "evidence
from witnesses on the basis that what is said to [it] is confidential and will not be disclosed unless [it] is required to do so in
the public interest by the relevant court."9 4 The willingness "of
witnesses to be able to talk openly to an accident investigator is
fundamental to the operation of the [AAIB]" so "[c]onfidential
statements or declarations made by a witness cannot be disclosed by the [AAIB] to any other party, including the police
and the CPS."9 5 However, witnesses who have provided a written
statement or declaration will usually be given copies and advised
that these may be shared with other investigators if the witness
Id. § 7(3) (repealed 2009).
Id. §§ 48-63.
89Id. § 48.
90 Id. § 3.
91 See generally Memorandum of Understanding Between The Crown Prosecution Service and the Air Accidents Investigation Branch, http://www.aaib.gov.
uk/cms_resources/MOU%20AIB-CPS.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum of
Understanding].
92 Id.
93 Id.
1.
87

88

94

Id.

17.

95

Id.

3, 17.
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wishes. 96 However, the AAIB "operate[s] on a principle of
openly sharing factual technical evidence obtained during an investigation with other agencies involved in investigating the
same event, unless precluded from doing so as a matter of
law."'9 7 The Memorandum states that
[i]f the CPS has decided to prosecute it should inform the Deputy Chief Inspector of the [AAIB] describing (in accordance with
the current law and procedure on disclosure to third parties) the
basis of the prosecution. The [AAIB] will review its evidence
and, subject to the legislation, share that evidence which can be
disclosed. If additional evidence or information is held, which
cannot be released without an order from the relevant court, the
CPS will be advised whether it potentially undermines the prosecution case. If the [AAIB] report is available, the CPS will be
directed to the relevant section of the report .... Information
given to [the AAIB] by the CPS will be treated as confidential
and not disclosed. 9 8
It is not clear what the status of this is and how much it protects safety data from being used in a criminal court. The British Airline Pilots' Association (BALPA) advises its members to
satisfy their statutory duty to report an accident, and thereafter
to "avoid making statements to anyone other than your BALPA
representative or legal adviser."9 9 It advises members, if pressed
for a statement, to state that they will make a statement as soon
as they have consulted BALPA. 10 0
V.

MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY REPORTS

It is impractical in the present context to deal with these in
any detail, but they should be noted. "The primary focus of reporting systems is to prevent accidents and in order to be effective, users of voluntary systems must have confidence that they
will not face retribution as a result of [disclosing matters which
are useful to safety, but which might otherwise remain unknown]."101 Accordingly, for voluntary systems to be useful, a
clear distinction must be made between acceptable conduct and
96

Id. 7 18-19.

97

Id. 1 19.

Id. 7 20-21.
99 British Airline Pilots' Association, Accident Informationfor Pilots, Guidelines
for Aircrew, 1 8, http://www.balpa.org/meta/footer/Emergency-help.aspx (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009).
100 Id.
101 IFALPA, supra note 14, at 1.
98

20091
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egregiously unacceptable conduct: wrong-doing that is intentional, criminal, or grossly negligent must be clearly defined.
the establishment of
The ICAO has published guidelines for
10 2
systems.
mandatory
and
voluntary
both
A.

MANDATORY REPORTING: SOME EXAMPLES

Mandatory systems require reports of certain types of events
or hazards, necessitating detailed regulations setting out who
shall report and what shall be reported.10 3
South Africa

1.

In South Africa, a mandatory report must be made of each
"accident" and "incident" to the Commissioner for Civil Aviation, the air traffic control services, and in the case of an accident, the police. 1°4 The definition of an "accident" is extensive
and far-reaching; in broad paraphrase, it is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft in which someone is fatally or seriously injured; in which an aircraft is so damaged that
it requires essential major repair or replacement of a component; ' 5 in which an aircraft is still missing after an official
search has been terminated without locating the wreckage; or in
which an aircraft is in a place where it is completely inaccessi-

ble. 10 6 An incident is an "occurrence, other than an accident,
associated with the operation of an aircraft, which affects or

could affect the safety of aircraft operations.
vestigated;'

'

All must be in-

the purpose of the investigation being "to deter-

102 INTERNATIONAL

CIVIL AVIATION

ORGANIZATION,

SAFETY MANAGEMENT MAN-

Doc 9859AN/474, §§ 9.6.6-9.6.7 (2d ed. 2009), availableat http://www.icao.
int/anb/safetymanagement/DOC_9859_FULLEN.pdf.
103 Id. § 9.6.6.
1997, §§ 12.02.1-12.02.2 (S. Mr.). Section
104 Civil Aviation Regulation,
12.02.3 deals with accidents and incidents outside South Africa. Sections
12.02.3-12.02.5 deal with the ensuing inquiries, investigations, and reports.
105 For example, when the nosewheel of an Airbus A340 went off the runway
on November 2, 2007, at Cape Town International Airport without any damage,
it was an "incident;" when a Boeing 737-200 shed one of its two engines while
taking off on November 7, 2007, at the same airport, it was an "accident." Occurrence Investigation Div., South African Aviation Authority, Aircraft Accident Report and Executive Summary, Ref. No. CA18/3/2/0622 (2007) (describing the
Airbus incident); Occurrence Investigation Div., South African Aviation Authority, Aircraft Accident Report and Executive Summary Ref. No. CA/3/2/0625
(2007) (describing the Boeing accident).
106 Civil Aviation Regulation, supra note 104, § 1.00.1.
107 Id.
108 Id. § 12.03.2.
UAL,
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mine . . . the facts . . . in the interest of the promotion of

aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents
or incidents, and not to establish legal liability."' 9
2.

United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom there must be an investigation into all
accidents and serious incidents, and there may also be an investigation into any other incident if the Chief Inspector "expects
to draw air safety lessons from it."1 ' However, a Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) must be made to the UKCAA in respect
of "occurrences which endanger or which, if not corrected,
would endanger an aircraft, its occupants or any other
person.""'

The ICAO distinguishes between an "incident" (one which
could or does affect safety) and a "serious incident" and notes
that the difference lies in the result, the latter being "(a)n incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly
occurred."' 1 2 There seems to be little point in an investigation
unless there is something to be learned, and the United Kingdom's Air Navigation Order (ANO) seems to be more practical
and closer to the ICAO standards.
The ICAO has published a highly detailed and thoughtful
"Safety Management Manual" designed to encourage proactive
practices."' Its guidelines explain that to overcome the bias
109 Id. § 12.03.1. The regulation must be read in light of § 12 of the Civil Aviation Act, which deals with the powers of the investigators, the procedures applicable, and inquests.
110 Civil Aviation (Investigation of Air Accidents and Incidents) Regulations,
1996 (S.I. 1996/2798), § 8 (U.K.).
1I Air Navigation Order, 2005/1970 §§ 142(3), 142(17) (U.K.) gives effect to
Council Directive 167123, Art. 8, 2003 O.J. (L167) (EN) of the European Parliament, and provides that
Without prejudice to the rules of criminal law, no proceedings shall
be instituted in respect of unpremeditated or inadvertent infringements of the law which come to the attention of the relevant authorities only because they have been reported under this article
. . . on occurrence reporting in civil aviation, except in cases of
gross negligence.
112 Annex 13, supra note 31, at 1-1. The Annex offers fourteen examples of
serious incidents; three give the flavor of what is contemplated: "Near collisions
requiring an avoidance manoeuvre to avoid a collision or an unsafe situation or
when an avoidance action would have been appropriate;" "Controlled flight into
terrain only marginally avoided;" and "Fuel quantity requiring the declaration of
an emergency by the pilot." Id. at Attachment C.
113 See ICAO, SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 102.
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caused by the tendency of mandatory systems to deal mainly
with "hardware" matters and thus to collect more information
on technical failures than on other aspects of operational activities, voluntary reporting systems aim to acquire more information on human-factors aspects of occurrences and errors to
supplement the information obtained from mandatory reporting systems,"'
as discussed above in the context of a 'Just
1 15
culture."

B.

VOLUNTARY REPORTING SYSTEMS:

CHIRP AND CAHRS

A 'Just culture" is one in which personnel have trust in the
system and are thus willing to report their errors, thereby pro-

viding a valuable contribution to safety.' 16 The ICAO guidelines
propose, in summary, that in voluntary reporting systems, reporters would not be under any statutory or other compulsion
to submit event or hazard information, but there may be incentives-for example, the waiver of enforcement action for unin-

tentional violations and the progressive development of safety in
the systems in which they work. To encourage reporting, such
systems must be non-punitive and must protect the sources of
the information by being confidential.117 This is usually
achieved by de-identification. 18 "Confidential incident reporting systems facilitate the disclosure of hazards leading to human
error, without fear of retribution or embarrassment, and enable
broader acquisition of information on hazards." 1 9
In the United Kingdom, the Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) is a system for confidential (not anonymous) aviation reports run by a charity to ensure
independence.1 21 If the reporter agrees, the information is
114

Id. § 9.6.6.

15

See supra Part III.

Int'l Fed'n of Air Line Pilots' Ass'ns, Improved Accident Prevention
Through a Just Culture 09POS02 1 (2009), available at http://www.vcockpit.de/
index.php?id=216&txttnews%5Btt news%5D=12254&txttnews%5Bcob %5D=
333.
117 See ICAO, SAFETY MANAGEMENT MANUAL, supra note 102, § 9.6.7.
118 Id. § 9.6.8.
116

119 Id.
120 See

CHIRP,

THE

UK

CONFIDENTIAL HUMAN FACTORS INCIDENT REPORTING

(2008), http://www.chirp.co.uk/downloads/CHIRP
%205pp.pdf. It gives the following history of the scheme:
CHIRP was formed in 1982 as a result of a joint initiative between
the Chief Scientific Officer Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), the
Chief Medical Officer CAA, and the Commandant Royal Air Force
Institute of Aviation Medicine (LAM). The programme was based
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made available in an unidentified form to those who can take
action to remedy problems. 1 2 ' It is distributed widely through
the Programme's publications to improve safety standards.' 2 2
The scheme relies on non-prosecution and the concealment of
identities in return for a willingness on the part of individuals to
disclose their experiences in order to alert others to safety-related matters. 2 ' The scheme is independent of the UKCAA and
is designed to complement the UKCAA's MOR scheme. 2 4
The SACAA is required to operate a Confidential Aviation
Hazard Reporting System (CAHRS) .125 The scheme enables anyone "involved in an accident or incident, or observing any accident, incident, hazard or discrepancy that may affect aviation
safety" to notify the SACAA. 1 26 There is a proviso that a "CAHRS
notification" does not absolve the person making it from also
making a mandatory report. 1 27 It is an offense for anyone involved in running the system to disclose anything that might
identify the originator of the notice, but as accidents must be
reported in any event, the apparent intention is merely to identify hazardous incidents that might otherwise be unknown, so
the reference to accidents seems pointless. 28 The SACAA has
issued guidelines for the operation of the CAHRS.129 These
state that it:
provides a means of reporting hazards in the aviation system
before there is a loss of life, injury or damage.
on the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) that had been
formed in the United States of America in 1976 under the management of National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA).
ASRS was introduced in response to a recommendation from the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) following an investigation into a Controlled Flight into Terrain major accident involving a US airline, which revealed that a number of previous near
accidents with similar causal factors had occurred but had not been
reported through the formal systems that existed at that time.
Id.; see also Air Navigation Order, supra note 111; Aviation Safety Reporting System, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/briefing/br_4.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2007).
121 CHIRP, supra note 120, at 5.
122 Id.
123

Id. at 1.

124

Id.
Civil Aviation Regulation, supra note 104, § 12.01.8.
Id. § 12.02.05.
Id. § 12.02.5(2).
Id. § 12.01.8(3).

125
126
127
128

129 CONFIDENTIAL AVIATION HAZARD REPORTING SYSTEM, CONFIDENTIAL HAZARD
REPORTING,

available at http://www.samaa.org.za/pdf/cahrs.pdf.
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The CAHRS is open to anyone who wishes to submit a hazard
report or safety deficiency confidentially and non-punitively.
CAHRS reports help to identify deficiencies and provide safety
enhancement in areas of aviation.
On being received, reports are validated as far as is possible and
reviewed with the objective of making the information as widely
available as possible whilst
maintaining the confidentiality and
30
source.'
the
of
integrity
However, the guidelines also state that "[n] o information contained within your submitted hazard report will be used for enforcement purposes unless it reveals a definite criminal act or a
confirmed repeat offence. 1 3 1
What does this mean? The SACAA is not a court and has no
power to determine guilt,'3 2 so the passage appears to confuse
the role of prosecutor and court. Moreover, such a statement is
directly contrary to the spirit of Attachment E; this includes voluntary reporting systems and limits what such "safety information" can be used for. 133 Information constituting a CAHRS
report clearly qualifies, for the scheme is operated by a body
designated to "promote aviation safety or to reduce the risk of
aviation accidents or incidents,' ' 34 which is required to "establish a confidential aviation hazard reporting system to promote
' 35
aviation safety or reduce the risk of accidents or incidents."'
The CAHRS policy seems to discourage those who might otherwise make useful safety-related reports. The statement above is
misleading, and those to whom it is directed cannot be assumed
to understand its constitutional and procedural impropriety.
Further, the CAHRS scheme is not operated independently of
the SACAA, unlike CHIRP.13 6 The result is that in South Africa
the confidential reports are to be made to the same body
charged with enforcement.

130

Id.

Id.
See South African Aviation Authority Online, About Us, http://www.caa.co.
za/ (follow "About Us" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
133 See Attachment E, supra note 28; Annex 13, supra note 31.
134 Civil Aviation Regulation, supra note 104, § 12.01.2(1)(a).
131

132

15 Id. § 12.01.8(1).
136 See South African Civil Aviation Authority Online, http://wwv.caa.co.za/
(follow "CAHRS" hyperlink; then follow "The CAHRS investigation process: what
happens to your report?" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 24, 2009).
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VI.

SOME PROSECUTIONS

A.

R. v.

TAYFEL

137

It is extremely rare to have access to a court's extended judicial examination of the legal weather in which pilots must fly.
Tayfel's case is thus of great interest.
The accused was employed by an airline. 138 He was charged
under various sections of the Canadian Criminal Code and convicted of criminal negligence causing death, four counts of criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and dangerous operation
of an aircraft under § 249(1) of the Criminal Code.1 "9 It states:
Every one commits an offence who operates;
(c) an aircraft in a manner that is dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances, including the nature and
condition of that aircraft or the140place or air space in or through
which the aircraft is operated;
The Piper Navajo Chieftain,' 4 ' which the accused was employed to pilot on a commercial charter, ran out of fuel and
crashed on an urban street while the pilot was preparing to land
at Winnipeg Airport. 142 Negligence had to be proved on all
counts including § 249(1) because Canadian law does not permit offenses of strict liability. 143 Justice Beard made an extensive
review of the Canadian law relating to negligence and concluded that this meant "proof of a modified objective intention,
that is, modified to take into account the circumstances but not
the personal characteristics of the accused short of incapacity,
and not a subjective intention."144 Her conclusion was that:
When the accused's conduct is considered as a whole, it is clear
that it was a marked and substantial departure from that of a
reasonable and prudent person flying a commercial aircraft over
137R. v. Tayfel, [2007] 221 Man. R.2d 135, 2007 MBQB (Can.).

R. v. Tayfel, [2008] 226 Man. R.2d 302, 2008 MBQB 101 (Can.).
Id. 4.
140 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. § 249 (2008).
141 The Chieftan is a widely-used family of cabin-class, twin-engine aircraft designed for general aviation and used as a trainer for pilots seeking a twin-engine
rating for their licenses. It can carry six passengers and, though it is designed for
single-crew operation, some countries' regulations may require a crew of two
pilots.
142 Tayfe4 226 Man. R.2d at
8-9.
143See Tayfe, 221 Man. R.2d 16.
138

139

I- Id.
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a highly populated city and showed a wanton and reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other people.' 45
The Piper Chieftain is widely approved by national aviation
authorities as a type of aircraft that may be flown by a single
pilot, 146 as was the case here. The accused alone was thus responsible for determining the fuel to be carried and whether147
and if so, where-more would have to be obtained en route.
The complex calculation is commonly defined by statute and
1 48
involves more than just the certified range of the aircraft.
The calculations must take into account the amount required to
reach the destination safely (it may have to be a predetermined
en route fuel supply), plus sufficient extra fuel for various prescribed en route contingencies and in-flight delays including adverse weather, plus an additional percentage as a further safety
margin. 149 Bearing in mind that it may be inadvisable or even
illegal 15 to fill the tanks of an aircraft to capacity before setting
out, Justice Beard reviewed the various considerations and procedures involved (as explained by the expert witnesses) and reviewed the calculations required to determine the legal
minimum fuel to be carried before taking off. Justice Beard
compared those procedures to those said to have been performed by the accused.' 5 1 She concluded that "[a]fter taking a
look at all of the factors in this case, it is clear that what happened here was not a small error or a momentary lapse in care
that had tragic results. The accused made several intentional
145Id.

139.
Where such type approval has been given, however, operators may impose
their own standards. For example, the single-engine Pilatus P12 is specifically
designed and has been approved for single-pilot operations, but for reasons of
safety the Red Cross Society in South Africa which uses P12s as emergency ambulances operates it with two pilots. Descent Below Minimum Altitude Results in Tree
Strike During Night, Nonprecision Approach, 58 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION AcciDENT PREVENTION 1, 2 (2001).
147 See, e.g., Civil Aviation Regulation, supra note 104, § 91.01.2; see also Tayfel,
221 Man. R.2d 47.
148 See Canadian Aviation Regulations SOR/96-433 § 602.88 (2009).
149 See id.
150 Because fuel has weight, fuel is itself consumed to carry it; accordingly, it is
financially wasteful and unecological to carry any excess. Further, the payload,
the weight of the aircraft, and the weight of fuel must be considered together
because the legal maximum take-off weight of the aircraft may be exceeded if the
tanks are simply filled to capacity. It may accordingly be necessary either to reduce the payload or to take off with partly filled tanks and plan refueling stops en
route to the final destination; alternatively, that aircraft type may be unsuitable
for the proposed flight entirely.
151 Tayfel, 221 Man. R.2d
144-50.
146
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,,152 It is precisely such conof where criminal liabilexample
duct that IFALPA offered as an
15
ity may well be appropriate. 1

decisions that led to the crash ....

B.

TS-LBB

154

This case is an illustration of what may happen when the
safety investigation and the criminal courts become involved simultaneously.1 55 On August 6, 2005, both engines of an ATR 72200156 failed when en route from Bari, Italy to Djerba, Tunisia. 157 Despite the pilots' attempts to restart them, the aircraft
58 Sixteen of the
ditched in the Mediterranean near Sicily.'
59
killed.'
were
thirty-nine people on board
The Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza del Volo (ANSV) found
that the day before the crash-August 5-the pilots had reported that the fuel quantity indicator (FQI) on aircraft TS-LBB
was faulty.1 6 ° When the aircraft was serviced earlier that evening, it was replaced with a type suitable for the aircraft's
smaller variant, the ATR-42, but not for the ATR-72. 1 6 ' Tests by
the ANSV subsequently revealed that, when fitted to the ATR-72,
an FQI designed for the ATR-42 would report that the tanks still
held 1,800 kg when they were in fact completely empty. 162 Relying on the misleading information on the instrument before
them, the crew believed when taking off from Bari that the aircraft was carrying 2,700 kg of fuel-more than sufficient for the
Id. 139.
See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
154 For convenience, references are identified by the national registrations of
the aircraft involved.
152
153

155 AGENZIA NAZIONALE PER LA SICUREZZA DEL VOLO, FINAL REPORT: AccIDENT

ATR 72 AiRcRAFr REGISTRATION MAKS TS-LBB, at XIV (2005), available at http://www.ansv.it/cgi-bin/eng/FINAL%20REPORT%20ATR%2072.pdf
[hereinafter ANSV]; TragediaDell' ATR CondannatiPilota e Techici di Tuninter,LA
REPUBBLIGA Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.repubblica.it/2009/03/sezioni/cronaca/
palermo-atr/palermo-atr/palermo-atr.html (Italy).
156 The ATR 72-200 is a twin-turboprop, short-haul regional airliner built in
France and Italy. It seats up to 74 passengers in a single-class configuration and is
operated by a two-pilot crew. ANSV, supra note 155, at XIV, 27-28, 31-32; The
ATR ATR-72, http://www.airliners.net/aircraft-data/stats.main?id=42 (last visited
Sept. 11, 2009).
157 ANSV, supra note 155, at 14.
158 Id. at 14-15.
159 PilotJailedfor Sicily Air Crash, BBC NEWS, Mar. 24, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/7962082.stm.
160 ANSV, supra note 155, at 2.
161 Id. at 3.
162 Id. at 116.
INVOLVING
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flight to Djerba. 161 Using fuel consumption and uplift figures
recorded from TS-LBB's preceding operations, the ANSV was
able to calculate that the total fuel on board when leaving Bai
was merely 570 kg, thus confirming the pilots' statement that
when the engines stopped, the FQI showed that there were still
1,800 kg available and that they had followed the correct procedures in their vain attempts to restart the engines. 1 64 As part of
the ANSV's investigations, what happened to the pilots was studied and reproduced by test pilots in a full ATR-72 flight simulator. 165 This showed that, had the crew immediately configured
the aircraft for powerless flight when the engines stopped instead of attempting to restart them, TS-LBB might have possibly
glided safely to the airport at Palermo.' 6 6
The criminal court 16 7 relied on these simulations and concluded that the crew should have disregarded the contradictory
fuel indications on various instruments in front of them, realized that they had no fuel, and not attempted to restart the engines in the belief that the engine failure was for some other
reason than fuel exhaustion. 168 According to some press reports, the prosecutors relied on CVR transcripts to support allegations that after both the airplane's engines had failed, the
captain panicked and prayed instead of following emergency
procedures and then opted to crash-land in the Mediterranean
instead of trying to reach the nearest airport. 169 The ANSV report draws a very different picture-that of a crew struggling to
make sense of confusing data and even securing the help of an
170
airline engineer who was fortuitously on board as a passenger,
for the ditching acand finally preparing TS-LBB in good 17time
1
cording to all the correct procedures.
In its report, the ANSV
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 155, 195.
165 Id. at 121.
166 Id. at 124. For a fuller account, see the Report on the Flight Safety Foundation's Aviation Safety Network. Aviation Safety Network, http://aviationsafety.net/database/record.php?id=20050806-0 (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
167 LA REPUBBLICA, supra note 155; ATR72, Le Cause Della Tragedia, LA REPUaBLICA,
Mar. 23, 2009, http://palermo.repubblica.it/dettaglio/atr72-le-casuedella-tragedia/1608169 (Italy).
168 ATR72, Le Cause Della Tragedia, supra note 167.
169 See, e.g., BBC NEws, supra note 159.
17o See, e.g., ANSV, supra note 155, at 14-16.
171 Id.
163
164
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within its field of responsibility, in completion of the technical
investigation in question attempted to guarantee observance of
those regulatory provisions contained in Annex 13 ICAO that
recognize precise rights to certain States. Part of these rights,
however, was found to be limited in the light of that envisaged by
the criminal procedures system in force, on the
occasion of the
172
simultaneous inquiry by the judicial authority.
It added that it was necessary to emphasize a complaint made
to the judicial authority concerned, which the ANSV "deemed
penalising for the purposes of prevention and not in line with
the provisions of Annex 13 of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, even though the judicial authority behavior was in
1 73
accordance with the applicable Italian criminal law."
The effect was that safety data, including CVR data, lost the
protection afforded under paragraph 5.12 of Annex 13.174 Further, the ANSV drew attention to the fact that the purpose of
the simulations was not to evaluate the performance of the crew
1 75
but "to consider the operational scenario and its difficulties.'
It noted that the simulation crews (described by the ANSV as
"captains at highest professional level") experienced difficulties
in managing the situation due to the distractions they faced,
even though they had been fully informed beforehand about
176
the investigation into the problems faced by pilots of TS-LBB.
The report emphasized explicitly and in detail the difference
between the desperately difficult conditions under which the
ditching took place-including failure of essential flight instruments as a result of the loss of both generators that caused addi7
tional electrical emergencylV7 -and
the safe and controlled
8
1

conditions of the simulation.

7

CVR data, which would have been protected safety information as prescribed by Annex 13, was relied on to convict the
commander, who was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment
172

Id.

173 Id.

at XIII.
at 131.

See Annex 13, supra note 31,
5.12; ANSV, supra note 155, at 132.
ANSV, supra note 155, at 172.
176 Id. at 172-73.
177 Id. at 126-27, 173. The crew was no longer able to determine the exact
direction to, and distance from, Palermo by using radio navigation aids (VOR/
DME) and had to make repeated radio calls for this crucial information. Id. at
126-27. Only standby instruments which require no electrical power remainedsuch as the air speed indicator, attitude indicator, and altimeter. Id.
178 Id. at 172-73.
174
175
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for manslaughter in March 2009.179 At the time of writing, June
2009, the verdict and sentence are being appealed."8 According to BBC News, "[S] ix others, including the co-pilot and head
Tuninter, were jailed for between eight and ten
of the airline
1

years."

18

It will be recalled that Attachment E envisages lifting the protection only where an "intent to cause damage, or conduct with
knowledge that damage would probably result, equivalent to
reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct" are involved.' 8 2 This test was never applied by the criminal court, and
the TS-LBB case illustrates the danger of confusing an investigation of safety issues with the imposition of criminal liability.
The ANSV also noted other adverse consequences of the involvement of the criminal authorities that were caused by their
seizure of the CVR and FDR as they were recovered.' 83 First,
safety was compromised by the delay, preventing the publication
of efficient and rapid prevention measures. 184 Second, these delays might have endangered evidence because of the need for
urgent technical management by the ANSV of flight recorders
in order to preserve their contents."8 5 Third, delays were caused
to the involvement of representatives and consultants of foreign
states who were entitled to participate in the inquiry as stipulated by the Chicago Convention.186 Finally, the criminal authorities released CVR data to the press in both written and
audio format. The ANSV pointed out that some of this was irrelevant to the reconstruction of the dynamics of the event, was in
violation of paragraph 5.12 of the Convention, and could have
serious negative consequences for safety. 1 87 The 8ANSV called
for changes to Italian law to address these issues.'
While it is not appropriate in this context to criticize a sovereign court's findings of fact, it is clear that the ANSV investigation into the crash had been hampered by the concurrent
criminal proceedings and that the criminal court felt free to ig179 See Annex 13, supra note 31,
NEws, supra note 159.

180

BBC

NEWS,

5.12; ANSV, supra note 155, at 132; BBC

supra note 159.

181 Id.

Attachment E, supra note 28, 4.1.
ANSV, supra note 155, at 184.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 SeeAnnex 13, supra note 31, 1 5.24-5.24.1; ANSV, supra note 155, at 185.
187 ANSV, supra note 155, at 185.
188 Id. at 185-86.
182
183
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nore the protections of Attachment E that ought to have been
accorded to evidence consisting of safety data that was used by
the prosecution in the trial."8 9 It is not our submission that the
pilots were innocent; our argument is that the violation of the
provisions of the Chicago Convention rendered the convictions
unsafe-indeed it is quite possible that, had criminal proceedings been conducted in accordance with Annex 13, there may
have been convictions nonetheless while preserving the protection and integrity to be accorded to safety data. The case revealed that Italian law fails to ensure full compliance with the
international law set out in the Convention and its Annex 13 in
particular. 9 ' Italian legislation is deficient, and no monitoring
and oversight procedures have been established.' 91
C.

N600XL

Unfortunately, the TS-LBB prosecution is not the only illustration of cases where Annex 13 and Attachment E have been compromised. One particularly troubling case involves a Boeing
737-8EH on a scheduled flight from Manaus to Brasilia. On
September 29, 2006, the 737 collided in mid-air with an Embraer Legacy business jet (N600XL) en route to New York via
Manaus.192 The Boeing crashed, killing all on board, but the
Legacy landed safely despite being seriously damaged.

93

Its

crew was arrested and, together with a number of military air
traffic controllers, was charged."9 The concurrent criminal investigation by the police and the technical investigation by the
Brazilian Air Force Centro de Investiga~do e Preven~do de Acidentes
Aeronduticos (CENIPA) resulted in a wholly unsatisfactory situation and great prejudice to the pilots, who claimed that they
were complying with the altitude clearance provided by the air
traffic controllers, who were themselves excluded from the in189 See Attachment E, supra note 28,

3.1-3.5; ANSV, supra note 155, at 132,

184-86.
190 See ANSV, supra note 155, at 185.
191 Id.
192 AERONAUTICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION & PREVENTION CTR., FINAL REPORT
A-OOX/CENIPA/2008 12 (2008), available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Aviation/
Brazil-CENIPA/MidairCollisionFinalReport_1907_English-version.pdf.
193 Id.
194 US Pilots Charged in Brazilian Plane Crash - Americas - International Herald
Tribune, NYTIMES.COM, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/08/
world/americas/08iht-plane.3836464.htm?_r=1.
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vestigation by the police.1 9 5 The simultaneous involvement of
the police and CENIPA with different technical and political
agendas has led to confusion. 19 6 IFALPA drew attention to the
consequences of preempting the results of an expert technical
investigation with a judicial investigation, which may not be
technically competent, pointing out that this is counter-productive to improvement of air safety.' 9 7 IFALPA called on the prosecutor's office in the Brazilian Ministry of Justice to comply with
ICAO Annex 13 concerning post-accident prosecutions, and to
"correct the premature action of the Polfcia Federal by waiting
until the findings of the technical investigation [were] reported.' 91 8 This was followed by a further statement by IFALPA
when the two pilots of the Legacy and the air traffic controllers
were indicted by Judge Murilo Mendes of the Brazilian Federal
Court in Sinop, to the effect that
[t]he decision to proceed with the indictment flies in the face of
international best practice as the charges against the two pilots
and four Air Traffic Controllers also indicted are solely based on
an incomplete and non-technical investigation by the Policia
Federal.
Since there has not been any factual support advanced for a finding that there was any intent by the Legacy crew to place their
aircraft in danger, there should be no basis for prosecution
under Brazilian law and therefore, Judge Mendes' ruling is
flawed and counter productive to the improvement of air safety.
Allowing a police investigation to preempt the findings of the
independent technically competent investigation will not help to
establish the sequence of events that led to the tragic mid air
collision and as a result, an opportunity to improve the safety of
the air transport system will be lost. 9 9
195 AERONAUTICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION & PREVENTION CTR., supra note
192, at 240. The Brazilian authorities released a transcript of the clearance, confirming explicitly the claim by the pilots of the Embraer. Paulo Prada, Brazil
Court Gives Police 3 Days to Free US. Pilots in Crash Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006,
at A13, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E7DA
1631F935A35751CA9609C8B63. The IFALPA press release summarizes the
problems clearly. Press Release, Int'l Fed'n of Airline Pilots' Ass'ns [IFALPA],
IFALPA Says Brazilian Policia Federal Recommendation that Legacy Crew Be
Prosecuted Is Fundamentally Flawed (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.aeronautas.org.br/segvoo/08PR07.pdf.
196 AERONAUTICAL ACCIDENT

INVESTIGATION

&

PREVENTION

CTR.,

supra note

192, at 240.
197

IFALPA, supra note 195.

198 Id.

199 Press Release, IFALPA, IFALPA Says Judge Mendes' Decision to Indict Lepore, Paladino and the Air Traffic Controllers is Fundamentally Flawed and 'a
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The troubling feature is the extension of criminal liability to
cases where it has not been established that the state of mind of
those charged falls within the terms of Attachment E. We are
not suggesting that in all the cases there was no error on the
part of those charged; what is being objected to is the equation
of "error" with fault and blameworthiness, with the consequence
that the burden of proof of guilt is shifted from the prosecution
onto those charged with the consequences of the "error," and
who are then expected to prove their innocence.2 °0
D. G-OBMM
In TS-LBB, the engineers and the airline were convicted, and
the facts of that case bear comparison with the prosecution and
conviction in Britain of British Midlands Airways in a case where
another aircraft lost power due to poor maintenance.2 1
G-OBMM, a Boeing 737-400, was presented for service after a
routine maintenance inspection of both engines the previous
night.21 2 The aircraft left from East Midlands Airport on a char-

ter flight to the Canary Islands, but lost power almost totally
20 3

from both engines while in the climb shortly after taking off.

With great skill, the pilots virtually glided the aircraft to land
safely at Luton.2 °4
In summary, the report of the Air Accident Investigation
Branch of the Department of Transport (AAIB) found that in
order to perform the inspection, it had been necessary to remove certain parts from each engine; these had not been replaced, causing an almost complete loss of lubricating oil as GOBMM climbed, and consequently caused a nearly total loss of
thrust.2 5 The AAIB found that there had been various failures
Crime' Against Air Safety, (June 4, 2007), available at http://www.ifalpa.org/
downloads/Level 1 /Press%20&%20Media/2007/08PRL09%20-%20IFALPA%20
comment%20on%20Lepore%20&%20Paladino%20indictment.pdf.
200 See Rachel A. Campbell, Comment, Liability of Independent Servicers and Repairers of Aircraft, 54J. AIR L. & CoM. 181, 192 (1988). For a list of other instances, see a recent survey: David Esler, Eight Risk: The Threat of Criminalization,
AVIATION WK., Mar. 10, 2009, available at http://www.alpl.lu/cms09/index.php?
option=comcontent&view=article&id= 19:flight-risk-the-threat-of-criminalization&catid=86:press-articles&Itemid= 192.
201

AIR ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION BRANCH, REPORT ON THE INCIDENT TO BOEING

737-400, G-OBMM NEAR DAVENTRY 71 (1996), available at http://www.aaib.gov.
uk/cms-resources.cfm?file=1 3.1996%20G-OBMM.pdf.
202 Id. at 3.
203 Id. at 3-4.
204 Id. at 4.
205 Id. at 71.
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to comply with the aircraft's maintenance manual, blamed the
airline's management for these failures, and made recommendations accordingly.2 °6 The basis of the prosecution that followed was that there were deficiencies within the operator's
organization that led to failures to supervise staff adequately to
ensure that correct servicing procedures were strictly complied
with. 207

This case is an illustration of corporate criminal liability being
extended into safety in aviation, suggesting that the necessary
mens rea can be found in the corporate structure.2 °8 It highlights
the point that while trust is reposed in pilots to fly safely, they
are obliged to trust the quality of maintenance of the aircraft
and the proper discharge of the oversight responsibilities
of
20 9
management and each state's aviation authority.
E. G-AWNO

("NOVEMBER OSCAR")

This case involved the prosecution of a captain.210 The aircraft, a Boeing 747-136 operated by British Airways, was one of
the earliest versions of the familiar 'jumbo" jets designed in the
1960s. 21

The 136-series required a flight crew of three mem-

bers-captain, first officer, and flight engineer.212 Some time
after coming into service, G-AWNO's avionics had been modified to incorporate an early version of a new form of the Instrument Landing System (ILS), which enabled it to land
automatically on suitably equipped runways in visibility so poor
that the runway cannot be seen from the air-a so-called Category II or III landing depending upon the measurement of the
visibility. The 136-series had not been designed for such avionics; in a detailed and authoritative account of the incident and
the trial, Stephan Wilkinson notes that there had been complaints from crews about them, both generally and also with particular reference to G-AWNO itself.2 13 Under Civil Aviation

Authority (CAA) regulations, the automatic landing aid had to
206 Id.

at 49, 72-73.

207 British Midland Fined, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, July 31, 1996, at 9. The edito-

rial comment is that the prosecution was "unprecedented." Id.
208 Id.
209 See id.

210 Stephan Wilkinson, The November Oscar Incident, PILOT, Feb. 1994, at 32,
available at http://forum.aeforum.net/index.php?showtopic=384754.
211 Id. at 34.
212 Id.
at 33-34.

213 Wilkinson, supra note 210, at 34-35, 37.
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be2 operated
by two pilots, both of whom had been trained to use
14
it.

On the incident flight, only the captain and flight engi-

neer were so qualified; the first officer had recently joined British Airways and had not yet undergone the further specialized
training. 21 5 The captain himself was an experienced pilot, but,
though he had logged 15,000 hours on 747s, he had only simulator experience in Category II and III landings using the new
21
landing aid.

6

When descending to land in thick fog at London Heathrow in
November 1989 at the end of a scheduled service from Mauritius via Bahrein, G-AWNO's final approach, using the automatic
system, had been misaligned with the runway and the captain
had to discontinue it.2 17 While climbing away, G-AWNO passed

within five feet of the roof of the former Penta Hotel on the
edge of Heathrow Airport, which was seventy feet high.2 18 On
its second approach G-AWNO landed safely. 219 The captain was
charged with the two "endangering" offenses under the Air Navigation Order, 220 but in paradoxically inconsistent verdicts, he
was convicted only of endangering the aircraft and those on
board it, and acquitted of endangering persons and property on
the ground.221
It emerged at the trial that the entire flight had been beset by
problems that culminated in the dangerous missed approach.2 22
Due to unforecast headwinds, more fuel had been consumed
than planned; 223 the navigation aids had been troublesome; and
214

Id. at 34.

215

Id.

216

Id. at 32, 34.

217

Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 36.

218
219

220 Air Navigation Order (ANO), 2005, S.I. 2005 no. 1970, arts. 73, 74. This is
the ANO in force at the time of writing. The numbers of the Articles have
changed over successive revisions, but the definitions of these two offenses have
not:
Endangering safety of an aircraft
73. A person shall not recklessly or negligently act in a manner
likely to endanger an aircraft, or any person therein.
Endangering safety of any person or property
74. A person shall not recklessly or negligently cause or permit an
aircraft to endanger any person or property.
221 Wilkinson, supra note 210, at 33, 37.
222 Id. at 37.
223 Id. at 34. It is not clear whether this had been canvassed at the trial, but
Wilkinson makes the point that though G-AWNO was still "legal," fuel would have
been approaching a critical limit. Id. at 36.
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of the three pilots, the captain alone had not succumbed to
food poisoning with associated vomiting, severe pain, and diarrhea after the flight crew and the cabin crew had dined together
in Mauritius. 2 24 The captain had been obliged to fly G-AWNO
singlehandedly in the dark for over five hours and was apparently very tired by the time the flight reached Heathrow.225 The
captain was made aware that the cost of diverting the flight to a
different destination would have been great: G-AWNO and 255
passengers would have been in the wrong location, creating the
problems associated with missed connections, accommodation,
further transport at the company's expense, and repositioning
the aircraft.226 Overall, the pressures to land at Heathrow had
been severe.
Over Germany, the crew learned from the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) 227 of the fog at Heathrow. 22 In
order, however, to enable G-AWNO to make a Category III landing at Heathrow, rather than divert to another airport with better visibility, a British Airways official radioed a purported
authority to the first officer to assist the captain, notwithstanding that there was nothing in the CAA regulations to allow
this. 2 29 The final descent to the runway was complicated by the
faulty avionics 2 ° and, as Wilkinson explains, air traffic control
instructions to cope with the pressure of early-morning incoming traffic caused illegal reductions in separation distances between G-AWNO and other landing aircraft.2

1

In his evidence,

the first officer testified that he had not been consulted about
the radioed "authority" to assist the captain and was not only ill,
but unqualified, untrained, and inexperienced for Category II
or III operations. 21 2 He testified that he was a mere observer,
224 Id. at 33. A British Airways doctor had referred them to a doctor at Bahrein
who was unqualified in aviation medicine. He had prescribed drugs and certified
them fit for work, but did not take into account the agonizing abdominal distension caused by the lower cabin air pressure; those crew members who were still ill
were in severe pain in addition to their other symptoms. Id. at 33-34.
225 Id. at 34-35.
226 Id.
227 Many airports broadcast a non-stop and constantly updated voice recording
of essential airport information including the weather. FAA, Automatic Terminal
Information Service, http://www.faa.gov/ats/atct/sba/ATIS.htm (last visited
Oct. 31, 2009).
228 Wilkinson, supra note 210, at 34.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 34-35.
231 Id. at 37.
232 Id. at 34.
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was unable even to offer suggestions as to what was going wrong,
and had accordingly taken a positive decision that he would be
best advised to stay out of the captain's way.233 The result was
that the captain was obliged to land G-AWNO singlehandedly in
conditions, which by law-let alone as a matter of safe airmanship-required two specially trained pilots using sound
equipment.
The basis of the prosecution's case was that the captain had
been slow in applying full power to assist the climb after discontinuing the approach, and that this had led to the appallingly
close encounter with the hotel.23 4 Though this is not addressed
by Wilkinson, the submission could have been based only on
"safety data" such as from the FDR and CVR. Had the Chicago
Convention's Attachment E to Annex 13 existed in its current
wording and been complied with, this evidence would have
been inadmissible unless a foundation had been established by
prima facie evidence that the captain's conduct had been
"equivalent to reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct.

'2 5

It is doubtful whether the court would have held

that, in the circumstances under which an attempt was made to
land G-AWNO as set out above, such a foundation would have
been laid.
It is further unfortunate that there was no AAIB inquiry into
G-AWNO. Had there been, it is at least possible that enough
would have been exposed in the framework of safety-oriented
proceedings to discourage the use of the criminal law. Without
question, the sight and sound of what was then the world's biggest aircraft at one hundred feet over Staines using full goto
around thrust must have been terrifying (the artist's attempt 236
image);
excellent
an
is
paper
Wilkinson's
in
scene
the
capture
but the response did not advance safety. On the other hand, the
just culture clearly does work to that end; the next issue is how
to understand it better and extend its operation. G-AWNO
stands as a monument to the need for the rigorous application
of Annex 13.237
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 37-38.
235 Attachment E, supra note 28, 1 4.1.
236 See Wilkinson, supra note 210, at 32 (artist depiction not available online).
237 The court clearly had sympathy for the captain; he was fined £1,500 but the
UKCAA's demand that he pay £45,000 costs was rejected. Wilkinson comments
that the refusal to impose a prison sentence suggests that the judge thought the
matter should never have come to trial. The captain was demoted permanently
233
234
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Following the crash of a Fokker F28-1000 23 8 in Dryden, Ontario, on March 10, 1989, the commissioner who was appointed to
investigate, Justice Virgil P. Moshansky, remarked that "[t] his accident did not happen by chance-it was allowed to happen. 2 3 9
He was referring to the failure of the flight crew, of the airline,
and of government regulators to establish, maintain, and monitor safe operating systems, which together would have prevented
the crash, the immediate cause of which was an attempt to take
off when the wings were covered with snow. 24 0 The two-engine
aircraft had been refueled with one engine running because its
auxiliary power unit was unserviceable, which would have rendered it impossible to restart the engines if they were both shut
down on the ground because no external power unit was available at Dryden. 241 Although snow had accumulated on the wings,
no de-icing was done because de-icing with either engine running was prohibited by both Fokker and Air Ontario. 24 2 When
attempting to take off, the aircraft failed to gain altitude,
crashed, and caught fire.2 43 Both pilots, another crew member,
and twenty-one passengers perished. 24 4 The Commission of Inquiry found that "[t] he pilot-in-command made a flawed decision, but that decision was not made in isolation. It was made in
the context of an integrated air transportation system that, if it
had been functioning properly, should have prevented the decision to take off .. 245
It was found that "significant failures, most of them beyond
the captain's control," had been involved, and the Commission
committed itself to examining "the regulatory, organizational,
to first officer by British Airways, but he resigned; he never flew again, and ultimately took his own life. Id. at 36-38.
238 The Fokker F28-1000 is a two-engine regional jet built by a consortium of
Dutch, British, and German companies, carrying up to sixty-five passengers.
Statemaster-Encyclopedia: Fokker F28, http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Fokker-F28 (last visited Sept. 27, 2009).
239 Clyde H. Farnsworth, CanadianJudge Calls Air Crash Avoidable, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 27, 1992, at B1-B2.
240 Id. at B2.
241

Id.

Daniel E. Maurino et al., Exploring the Role of the Transportation System and
Human Factors in the Crash of Flight 1363, ICAO JOURNAL, Sept. 1995, at 15.
243 Id. at 16.
244 Id. at 14.
245 Id. at 17 (quoting VIRGIL P. MOSHANSKY, COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE AIR
ONTARIO CRASH AT DRYDEN, ONT., FINAL REPORT 1, 102 (1992)).
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physical and crew components" to determine how these "may
have influenced the captain's decision. 246 In the final analysis,
the Commission concluded:
Capt. Morwood, as the pilot-in-command, must bear responsibility for the decision to land and take off in Dryden on the day in
question. However, it is equally clear that the air transportation
system failed him by allowing him to be placed in a situation
that
should have
where he did not have all the necessary tools 24
7
supported him in making the proper decision.
Justice Moshansky drew attention to various safety-related deficiencies and failings on the part of Air Ontario specifically,
within the aviation industry generally, and in the regulatory domain of Transport Canada. 248 He noted that "[t] he aircraft crew

members must contend with the total operating environment of
a given flight and any constraints placed upon them by their
aircraft, their air carrier, the immediate operational infrastructure, and the regulator. ' 249 He said that " [h] ad the system operated effectively, each of the factors might have25 been identified
and corrected before it took on significance.

1

VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS
Aviation safety is obviously in the interests of the public, the
operators, and governments. There is clearly a balance to be
sought between resorting to the criminal justice system to
counter every threat to flight safety, and complete non-criminalization. What emerges is a need for clearer guidelines to determine which cases merit the attention of the criminal justice
system, and Annex 13 and Attachment E provide that guidance.
The purposes of a safety-directed investigation and of a criminal
inquiry are so different that they cannot be conducted simultaneously without hampering both, and thereby endangering
safety. The ANSV made that point explicitly in its report on the
TS-LBB investigation.25 '
Moreover, because the purposes of the two procedures are
different, it is unsafe to base a prosecution, which is directed
towards demonstrating guilt, on what is found in the safety-di246 Maurino, supra note 242, at 17.
247 Daniel E. Maurino et al., Six Years After the Dryden Tragedy, Many Accident
Investigation Authorities Have Learned Its Lessons, ICAO JOURNAL, Oct. 1995, at 25.
248

Id. at 24.

249

Maurino, supra note 242, at 15.
Id.
ANSV, supra note 155, at 184-85.

250

251

FLYING SAFELY

2009]

777

rected investigation. Again, the TS-LBB proceedings illustrate
this: the ANSV found that-to put it simply-the pilots were
confused by the conflicting information with which they were
confronted and made erroneous decisions that inevitably led to
"error" to find
the ditching.2 52 The criminal court relied on this
25
blameworthy fault and to convict accordingly. 1
Let us spell out our conclusion on this aspect explicitly. Taking the TS-LBB as a paradigmatic example, we are not arguing
that the conviction of the pilots was wrong and that they were,
demonstratively, free of blame. Our point is that the convictions
were unsound and unsafe because, by taking the course that the
Italian criminal justice system did, the pilots were placed in the
position of having to prove a negative if they were to be acquitted. In other words, because they made an error, their guilt was
presumed from the outset unless they could prove their innocence. Accordingly, their trial was unfair. The effect is to establish a presumption that every error is blameworthy and
punishable as a crime unless the contrary is proved.
Further, to reach the conclusions it did, the criminal court
had to rely on material such as CVR data, which was brought
into existence for a quite different purpose. The Chicago Convention explicitly prohibits the use of such material for any purposes other than the investigation of accidents or incidents
"unless the appropriate authority for the administration of justice in that State determines that their disclosure outweighs the
such action may have
adverse domestic and international impact
' 25 4
on that or any future investigations.
The guidelines set out in Attachment E provide a simple test
to determine what the impact may be. 5 5 The cases we have considered all underline the need for national laws to include Annex 13's standards and recommendations explicitly. For
example, by following the course it did, the Italian court in the
TS-LBB case simply brushed aside the mandatory standards that
would have promoted both safety and justice.2 5 6
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13, supra note 31,
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Attachment E, supra note 28,
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The legal issues relating to mens rea in G-AWNO have been
examined at length elsewhere. 25 7 The central problem was the

extent to which strict liability could be imposed, and an attempt
was made in that paper to determine the policy underlying prosecution decisions in this and other cases. 5 s The ANO must be
interpreted in light of the Chicago Convention: Paragraph 3.1
of Annex 13 to the Convention 25 9 and Attachment E to Annex

13, in particular, give substance to the point that neither a 'just
and learning culture" nor Annex 13 are intended to protect misconduct. It is necessary to emphasize that the entire thrust of
the Attachment is directed towards safety and not the protection
from prosecution of air crew and other personnel who might or
might not be guilty of endangering it.
The captain of G-AWNO and both pilots in TS-LBB had to
solve problems that had developed as a result of a cascade of
decisions and actions taken by others.26 ° In G-AWNO, the captain might, indeed, have abandoned the attempt to land long
before but, as Wilkinson seems to make clear, it is one thing to
make such a criticism with objective hindsight about what one
should do, and another entirely when the decision has to be
taken under the stresses he was handling. 2 1 This was echoed
recently by the Italian authorities following the TS-LBB crash.2 6 2
It is suggested that, as a matter of law, even if one concedes for
the sake of argument that the captain of G-AWNO should have
abandoned the attempt to land at Heathrow much earlier-e.g.,
over Germany-and that the pilots of TS-LBB should not have
as
attempted to restart the engines, their conduct cannot qualify' 263
"reckless conduct, gross negligence or willful misconduct."
CVR and FDR data were apparently relied on by the prosecution
in G-AWNO, and definitely were in TS-LBB, without Annex 13
safeguards being even considered. In the case of G-AWNO, this
serves to emphasize the need for Attachment E. TS-LBB demonstrates the need for its rigorous application.
See Mervyn E. Bennun, Prosecuting Professional Pilots in the United Kingdom
After November Oscar: Reflections on the Law and Policy, 61 J. AIR L. & COM., 331,
331-64 (1996).
258 Id. at 335.
3.1.
259 Annex 13, supra note 31,
260 See supra Parts IV.B., IV.E.
261 Wilkinson, supra note 210, at 38.
262 ANSV, supra note 155, at 172-73.
4.1.
263 See Attachment E, supra note 28,
257
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In the N600XL crash, simply determining what actually happened has been bedeviled by the simultaneous involvement of
the various agencies and competing interests, and safety considerations seem to have been supplanted by efforts to impose and
evade blame in a welter of assertions and denials. The case illustrates the need to separate the technical investigation and the
investigation into any legal sequelae such as prosecutions, and
for the former to be completed first.
A further comment is that the G-OBMM and G-AWNO incidents both point to the danger of organizational weaknesses behind complex aircraft operations, and the need for careful
decisions to be taken in the context of meticulously designed
corporate decision-taking processes that will prevent essential information from falling through cracks in the corporate structure and not reaching those who must use it. The use of an
unqualified doctor, the assigned use of an aircraft with problematic avionics, and an improper instruction to the unqualified
first officer to meet the standards of a task he was not trained for
were factors that signaled clearly to the captain of G-AWNO that
the flight should not divert, but proceed to its scheduled destination, and constituted pressures to that effect. But did those
who knew each detail know of their total impact? Similar analyses can be applied to both the TS-LBB and G-OBMM cases:
safety-critical information was lost or missed due to faulty organizational procedures. This must be remedied by ensuring that
the investigation will address all latent and immediate factors
alike, without allocating greater importance to either.
In a closely-considered appraisal of the report on the crash of
C-FONF in Dryden, Maurino et al. remarks:
The message from the Dryden Report is two-fold. On the one
hand, there should be no doubt: there is still no substitute for a
properly trained, professional flight crew; they are the goalkeepers of aviation safety. On the other hand, no matter how hard
they try and no matter how professional they might be, humans
can never be expected to outperform the system which bounds
and constrains them. System flaws
will, sooner or later, defeat
264
individual human performance.

The relevance of this
equation of error-and
worthiness is worse than
plification. It tends to
264

observation to our theme is that the
pilot error in particular-with blamemerely an excessive or misleading simcamouflage the complex cascade of

Maurino, supra note 242, at 25.
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factors that can lie behind accidents and incidents, which need
to be exposed before they can happen again.
The need for national legislation to ensure compliance with
all the ICAO standards as set out in the Chicago Convention
cannot be overstated. Safety involves not just lawyers, the travelling public, and operators, but is a matter for government officials and lawmakers to ensure a sustained focus on training,
oversight, enforcement, and effective risk management. The
'just culture" involves both the philosophy and application of
law, and it works-the statistics show that.

